The concept and design of access federations have been widely accepted and their world-wide deployment is in progress. In an access federation, control of user information (personal identification information) is a key issue in its operation in terms of privacy. Pseudonym is proposed and implemented as a solution to this problem. We consider the case where the requirement of privacy protection by using pseudonyms and that of user identification for service providing conflict with each other. In this paper, we propose a "counting server" for the identification of different pseudonyms or social identities. SPs can use this identification information to provide special services such as student discount and limit of use. We also show an implementation of this scheme on Shibboleth/SAML platforms. Related protocols are designed, another SAML engine is provided on SP, and a counting server is provided. Furthermore, we analyze this scheme, and prove the security properties.
Introduction
The concept and design of access federations have been widely accepted and their world-wide deployment is in progress. In an access federation, the identity platform so far constructed for closed use within a single organization such as a university and an enterprise is made open to society-wise services. Identity federation is a key to the installation of access federation. This kind of deployment and installation are widely seen particularly in nation-wide academia in the world. Today, we can observe a number of nation-wide academic access federations. Actually, 66 access federations are listed in REFEDS (https://refeds.org/federations) as of Feburary, 2017. They include InCommon in the U.S., SWAM in Sweden, and GakuNin in Japan [10] . Furthermore, eduGain, an international federation of nation-wide federations, is being constructed to link academic identities all over the world. In an academic access federation, SAML [1] is adopted as the baseline technology for construction and operation.
In an access federation, control of user information (personal identification information) is a key issue in its operation. Because of the rapid growth in business activities in the Internet, the concern of privacy protection is raised as one of the fundamental human rights. This issue is identified as standardizing the handling of user attribute information, particularly obtaining user consent in attribute release. From the viewpoint of privacy protection as one of the human rights, the use of attributes must be minimized in authentication and authorization both at an identity provider 1 The University of Tokyo, Bunkyo, Tokyo 113-8658, Japan On the other hand, there are services in which user identification in a transaction is mandatory. Student discount is an example of such services where a special discount is offered when a user releases a specific attribute (student attribute). User-wise download limit of e-journal articles is another example of the business where some constraint is set to services for an individual. Here, an individual user is requested to release one's attribute for the use of a specific service. This requirement conflicts with the minimization of user attribute release from the viewpoint of privacy protection. An SP would like enough attributes to identify a user. Difficulty in reconciliation of this conflict is considered as a major hindrance in deploying such real world services in the Internet. In other words, solving this conflict would lead to widening the horizon of the Internet businesses.
Pseudonym is proposed and implemented as a solution to this problem. It provides the function of minimization of user attribute release under the assumption that the information as for who accesses what services should be controlled and minimized in view of privacy protection. In assuming pseudonym technologies, we have to provide enough reliability in service authorization which would include the identification of a user. Homomorphic cryptography technologies [3] are proposed as a solution to this problem. However, the performance problem is still to be solved. Although partially positive solutions have been proposed [8] , we have to say that we do not have substantial progress. In addition to the use of pseudonyms, considering that many users have several social identities at SNS sites, the problem of user This work is a revised version of Ref. [15] , the original publication. The preliminary version of this paper was published at Multimedia, Distributed, Cooperative, and Mobile Symposium (DICOMO 2015), July 2015. The paper was recommended to be submitted to Journal of Information Processing (JIP) by the chief examiner of SIGIOT.
c 2017 Information Processing Society of Japan identification of pseudonyms and social identities is becoming even more complicated.
In this paper, we propose a solution to this problem in a specific, but typical scenario. Concretely, in multiple access federations deployed on Shibboleth/SAML where an IdP and an SP belong to different federations, and they communicate by using multiple proxies for the federations, we propose a scheme of identifying a user on the SP side while using pseudonyms of one's identity on the IdP side. Generally, because IdPs and SPs belong to different trust circles, they must communicate by using a broker (proxy) that belongs to both trust circles. The use of proxies enables a user to control the data exchanged by IdPs and SPs. This trust model typically applies to a scenario where a user is provided with a service with a social identity of a certain SNS, while one is required to release one's attribute provided by the IdP of one's belonging organization (here, IdP is used as an attribute authority). One can control the attribute release of one's belonging IdP to the SP.
Assuming Shibboleth, pseudonyms are implemented as eduPersonTargetedID (ePTID). Different ePTIDs are generated for each of the SPs so that SPs cannot collude to identify users for deeper behavior analysis. This applies to the scenarios where proxies are used in the middle of data exchange as in Fig. 1 . Here a user is allowed to access an SP by using two different proxies. The identity of a user is pseudonymized by using two proxies, which guarantees the same effect as pseudonyms. An SP cannot identify the user in use. Generally, the identification is not necessary for providing service.
However, under such a pseudonym system, a certain class of services in which a restriction for each individual is set (e.g., the number of accesses per user) cannot be provided. Let us consider a service provided only once for each user. A user can avoid this restriction and get multiple accesses to the service by accessing multiple proxies to obtain multiple pseudonyms for which the SP cannot perform identification. In the case of Fig. 1 , we can consider different accounts (of F and G) owned by the same user that work as proxies. A user can access services multiple times by using different social identities, which is a way to avoid the service restriction.
To protect against this attack, we propose a "counting server," as a supplementary SP to the service. The system uses CID (counter ID) to partially share the information on the number of subscriptions and to partially hide the information by cryptography. An IdP issues and encrypts CID, a supplementary pseudonym, and sends it to SP via a proxy. An SP cannot decrypt the CID, but knows whether the service request matches the one previously issued by the same user. To this aim, the SP must send the identification request to the counting server. The counting server stores only the number of service uses per the combination of CID and SP, but does not store any information on account name and content of service. This separation of privileges enables an SP to set a restriction on the number of service uses, while keeping the pseudonymity.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 surveys related work. Section 3 specifies the problem of the scenario defined as above. Section 4 proposes our solution of counting servers together with the description of the protocol and encryption/decryption scheme. Section 5 analyzes our proposed system in terms of security. Section 6 concludes this paper.
Related Work
Several technologies have been proposed and implemented so far to protect privacy. In data mining, k-anonymity [16] is proposed and deployed [11] , [17] in which a partial anonymization is applied to data accumulated in the database, while keeping the precision of analysis.
On the other hand, homomorphic cryptography [3] applies encryption to whole data, which is a protection method against identification. It furthermore provides operations on encrypted data for the data analysis. Although this is applied to a wide range of fields [4] , [13] , the performance problem is still to be solved.
Pseudonyms are adopted by SAML [1] for privacy protection. This incomplete, but simple technology is adopted in many application fields [2] , [6] , [7] . c 2017 Information Processing Society of Japan Shibboleth provides ePTID as pseudonyms on SAML. In addition, Shibboleth has the principle of minimizing the release of attribute information. Particularly, unless requested by a peer SP, Shibboleth does not release user attributes including account name and email address. ePTID is used to assure the same claimant in transactions, and to enable a system to trace the log in the incident inspection etc. ePTID is computed for each SP, and user identification among multiple SPs is impossible in practice. Similar ideas can be seen in PPID [5] of OpenID. Reference [12] analyzes the privacy risk by identification when a transaction log of an SP is leaked to a user's belonging IdP, and proposes a solution by transforming pseudonyms on a proxy.
In addition to pseudonyms, proxy technologies are key to privacy protection under Shibboleth environments. Reference [14] proposes a proxy that encrypts attribute information by which a target IdP and SP are hidden from each other. Reference [9] proposes a method for attribute aggregation on SAML without using common identities among multiple attribute providers.
Problem: Conflict of User Anonymization
and User Identification
Motivating Scenarios
Let us consider a case where the requirement of privacy protection and that of user identification for service providing conflict with each other. We can often observe this kind of scenario as explained later. So far, we do not have effective solutions, which leads to concession or cancellation of service.
Example 1 Let us consider student discount in a newspaper subscription. In the subscription, an inspection as to whether a subscriber is a student is required. Furthermore, the subscription is limited to one for each subscriber.
Example 2 At the purchase of software and journal articles by downloading, the number of downloads in a site is limited for each client.
We assume that a subscriber has both social identities of SNS and organizational identities of one's belonging organization that operates its own IdP. We further assume that these subscriptions and purchases are performed by using the social identities because they are not considered as activities in one's belonging organization. However, some attribute may be released from its authority IdP to an SP beyond the background federation as an organization's welfare to its members.
As the trust relationship, SNSs and SPs belong to the same federation, and the SPs connect to IdPs via proxies that are provided by the federation that IdPs belong to. We assume that IdPs and SPs do not belong to the same federation, which means that a subscriber needs to explicitly request the attribute release to the IdP. Figure 1 illustrates this scenario. In the Figure, the federation, or its forming trust circle is surrounded by ovals.
Requirements of Privacy Protection
Assuming the scenarios above, we require the privacy-aware operations of services and federations. Concretely, ( 1 ) An organizational IdP does not release the information by which an SP can identify a user's identity. ( 2 ) The communication between an IdP and SP is performed by using proxies within a federation. We use proxies as a mandatory component to compete with the SP's tries for identification. Assuming the use of Shibboleth, ePTIDs as pseudonyms are available. By using them, SP cannot identify personal information of the user at service. Moreover, by using proxies, IdP does not know what kind of service is provided. These functions are critical in such a case where a researcher does not want to be identified at search and subscription of specific articles where privacy or specific intellectual properties matter.
However, even by using pseudonyms, an IdP can identify what SP a user accesses and an SP can identify what IdP a user belongs to. Considering stricter cases where such identification is not preferable, some kind of anonymization technology should be provided. For example, let us consider an SP that provides job hunting. A user of the SP, or a job seeker does not like one's belonging IdP (or its HR section) to know that one accesses such an SP. This risk can be alleviated by using proxies between communications of SPs and IdPs. By using proxies, IdP cannot identify the accessing SPs and vice versa.
In the case of a student discount, an SP identifies that a user has "student" attribute by linking one's account at the SP with the one at the belonging IdP. Here, the identity attributes other than "student" attribute need not to be provided. This scenario is enough for an SP to provide a student discount.
Requirements on the side of SPs
However, under the solution built as above, an essential requirement by an SP, to limit the number of uses for each user cannot be resolved. For example, let us consider a case where the number of student discounts available for each user is limited to a predefined one. If the IdP and the SP are fixed to one-to-one, we have only to link the number of use with the issued ePTID. However, if we assume multiple proxies (or social identity providers) to access a specific SP as in Fig. 1 , the identification is impossible if a single user uses multiple paths for the service.
As a simple solution to this problem, an IdP can issue a special pseudonym specific to an SP so that the SP can identify the user. Furthermore, this pseudonym can be encrypted against a third party proxy [14] . However, even in this solution, an IdP can identify what SP a user accesses, and an SP can identify a user from different proxies by using the specially issued pseudonym. In this meaning, the privacy requirements are not fully fulfilled.
User Identification Mechanism of Pseudonyms
In the rest of the paper, we use the term "identification of pseudonyms," meaning that we judge if two given pseudonyms represent the same claimant on a certain identity provider. This does not mean revealing the whole identity information of the claimant, but just checks the sameness.
Design of User Identification Mechanism of Pseudonyms
To resolve the conflict of privacy and user identification in our scenarios, we introduce a "counting server" supplementary to an SP. In the Figure, an IdP issues, encrypts and releases CID, a special pseudonym for each counting server to an SP via a proxy. The SP issues an inquiry to the counting server by using this CID as a key about the number of subscriptions. The counting server can only identify the number of subscriptions, but does not store any information concerning a user identity and content of service. By using this counting service, the SP can identify and limit the number of service subscriptions for each user. In Table 1 , we list the stakeholders and their roles in this solution.
We implement this idea on the environment where Shibboleth/SAML is used for operating IdPs and SPs, and multiple proxies are operated to communicate between IdPs and SPs. Because multiple proxies are assumed, user identification of different pseudonyms as different social identities, and counting of the number of service subscriptions for each user are critical.
In Fig. 2 , it is assumed that a proxy hides SP from the view of IdP. The proxy serves as an identity management system to Table 2 Service requests of counting servers.
Request
Description new generates a new counter query obtains the current value of the counter increment increment the value of the counter by a specified value.
If the result exceeds a predefined value, discards the action, and returns the error state decrement decrement the value of the counter by a specified value. If the result is less than zero, discards the action, and returns the error state reset reset the value of the counter to zero.
the target SP, while it serves the target IdP as a service provider in which it proxies the authentication request to the IdP, and also proxies the authentication assertion to the SP. At this process, the information of the original requester (IdP and SP) is hidden, by which the hiding process is provided. In this scenario, corresponding to the request of the proxy, the IdP defines an encrypted ID generated from a user ID. This encrypted ID is composed of the anonymized CID and salt for each proxy and encrypted by the public key of the counting server.
The counting server receives the encrypted ID generated by IdP and the counting request comprising service specification and counter request. It decrypts the encrypted ID by its private key, extracts CID, and provides the counting service specified by the request that it receives. The counters are persistently stored within the counting services. The service request is specified in Table 2 , including new, query to the counters, update, and reset. The SP obtains the number of subscriptions by inquiring for Counting Server about the value of counters, and checks the eligibility for the service. Figure 3 depicts the interactions of the IdP, proxy, SP, and Counting Server to implement the user identification of c 2017 Information Processing Society of Japan pseudonyms.
Implementation of Protocols
In Fig. 3 , User initiates an access to SP. Then SP requests authentication. By using the discovery service of DS, User selects one's IdP, and is authenticated. This process is a part of standard SAML authentication. However, here, the authentication request is regarded as the one from the intermediate proxy instead of SP. When the User is authenticated, IdP generates pseudonymized CID from a hash value of User's ID, and collects the CID and the salt for each of the requesting proxy, encrypts by using the public key of the counting server, and composes them into an "encrypted ID." The encrypted ID with User's attributes is sent to SP via the proxy. Then, SP sends the received encrypted ID, service specification, and the counting request to the counting server. The counting server processes the request, and returns the result to SP. Here, the SAML assertion sent by the proxy is shared in this communication of SP and counting server. Figure 4 depicts the processing of received SAML assertions on the side of SP and the counting server.
The request to the counting server is generated from the received SAML assertion and sent as a SOAP in the form of AttributeQuery to the URL provided by the counting server, and the result is sent back in the form of AttributeStatement as the reply to the original AttributeQuery. In other words, SP shares the SAML assertions in the communication between proxy and SP with that between SP and Counting Server. To this purpose, SP needs an additional SAML engine. In our implementation, this engine is built by using SimpleSAMLphp (https://simplesamlphp.org/) for implementation reasons. In Fig. 5 , we show an example SAML assertion that SP receives from proxy. This assertion is processed by SimpleSAMLphp part. We can flexibly write and insert PHP c 2017 Information Processing Society of Japan scripts to the protocol handling part in order to add a new counting service. The platform used in the implementation is listed in Table 3 .
Security Analysis
Assumptions on Trust First, we assume the conditions on trust: ( 1 ) PKI is assumed. IdP uses the public key of the counting server under the PKI. ( 2 ) There is a trust circle in which IdP and proxies participate.
Moreover, there is a trust circle in which SP and proxies participate. ( 3 ) Both IdP and SP trust the counting server.
Particulary by 2), we trust attributes exchanged among IdPs and SPs, which makes the analysis simple, and is a key to this kind of business.
Security Properties
On the requirements on services (identification of subscriptions):
Property 1 Counting server can identify the accessing entities that IdP identifies as the same claimant. Particularly, SP knows the number of subscriptions of a given User, provided that SP can link the User's ID and the user's identity on IdP by using CID and that the counting server counts the number of subscriptions by identifying the User by using CID. (Proof): Because IdP generates CID and encrypted ID by using User's ID and the public key of the counting server, the countc 2017 Information Processing Society of Japan ing server can validate its sameness by decrypting the encrypted information.
As for the security properties (requirements on anonymization):
Property 2 Only the Counting Server can decrypt CID issued and encrypted by IdP. SP and proxies cannot decrypt CID. Particularly, SP does not know the account name of a User registered on IdP. Furthermore, IdP does not know what service a User subscribes to. (Proof): Because IdP encrypts CID by using the public key of the counting server, the encrypted data cannot be decrypted by a party other than the counting server. Furthermore, because IdP just releases CID to a given proxy, IdP cannot specify SP.
In addition to them, there are some chances of falsification of cookies and assertions by users. Their integirity is guaranteed by using XML signature in SAML.
Limit of Service
Even when the proposed method is fully implemented, there is a case that SP can identify the identities of a User where different services are requested by multiple proxies. Concretely, unless the operation becomes stable and the number of service subscriptions grows sufficiently large, they do not fulfill the premises of anonymities for privacy protection in such as k-anonymity in data mining. For example, at the very starting point of service when the number of subscriptions is quite small, and the two service requests are issued simultaneously, SP can check whether the resulting counter value is two, in which SP can conclude that the two requests have been issued by the same claimant. At the launch of the services, we have to take care of irregularities of this kind to alleviate the privacy risk.
Another deficiency is the granularity of services. We assume site-wise management of counting. For example, in a journal download site, the total number of downloads can be controlled, while article-wise control is not provided. The granularity control is one of future work.
Furthermore, we assume a single counting server for a trust circle. When we consider federation among multiple trust circles such as multiple nation-wide access federations, our scheme does not apply. The extension of our scheme to such a complicated scenario is also one of our future work.
Concluding Remarks
We have proposed a solution for resolving the conflict of privacy protection and user identification in a specific scenario such as student discount under which multiple proxies exist, and identification is required for counting subscriptions of services. Our major aim is to lower the barrier of adoption of service subscription by privacy aware organizations such as universities. They can issue a member's attributes while protecting their privacy.
